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COMES NOW, the Respondent by and through Scott B. Muir, Deputy City Attorney, and
hereby ﬁles

its

Respondent’s Brief in the above-captioned matter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent (“Boise City”) agrees with the statement of the case

set forth in Appellant’s

brief other than as noted below.

Boise City points out What appears to be an oversight, as Appellants
appeal the dismissal of “the additional Plaintiffs that were added in the
(Appellants’ Br., p. 3.)

“[T]his appeal

is

based 0n Petitioners’

the ﬁrst seven listed Plaintiffs.” (Appellants’ Br., p. 3.)

there

were only

t0 “the ﬁrst

six Plaintiffs in the original

Complaint

But

Amended

they do not

Complaint.”

Amended Complaint

as can

(R., pp.

state that

brought by

be seen from the pleadings,

000007-000013), so the reference

seven listed Plaintiffs” must be inadvertent, and the appellants consist 0f those six

original Plaintiffs.

In the

Complaint as

Summary Statement of
if

Facts, Appellants

they were facts, rather than allegations.

either the Shoreline Plan or the

list

allegations

from the Amended

Boise City speciﬁcally disagrees that

Gateway Plan “obligated the City t0 ﬁnance the CCDC’S estimated

‘Project Costs’”. (Appellants’ Br., p. 4.)

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Boise City requests an award 0f attorney fees on appeal pursuant t0 Idaho Code

§ 12-1 17

and/or§ 12-121.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard ofreview 0f a district court’s decision t0 grant a motion to dismiss
standard as that used in

summary judgment. The

standard of review on appeal

is

is

the

the

same

same

as

applied by the district court on the motion;

movant

is

entitled to

judgment

i.e.,

there

as a matter of law.

is

n0 genuine issue of material

McCabe

v.

fact

and the

Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 956, 188

P.3d 896, 898 (2008).

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT THE ORIGINAL SIX
APPELLANTS LACKED STANDING TO BRING THE ACTION AND
DISMISSING THE CASE.

A.

The merits of this matter were never reached by
Motion

to

Dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)

Memorandum
for dismissal

this action

in Support

was

of Motion to Dismiss

&

the district court since Boise City ﬁled a

(6) (R., pp.

(R., pp.

000023-000024) along with a

000025-000030). Boise City’s argument

The

that Appellants lacked standing to ﬁle the action.

With a ﬁnding that Appellants lacked standing,

(R., p.

district court

000054) but went ﬁthher in

holding that Boise City’s commitment to allocate “revenue allocation financing,” also
“tax increment financing” (“TIF”), to the

Gateway Plan did not Violate
The

district court

dismissal 0f the Complaint

and 0f

to

Amend

and Alter Judgment.

upon a ﬁnding

itself

as

and the

Article VIII, § 3 0f the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp. 000056-000058.)

its

(R., pp.

Memorandum Decision
000097-000106.)

that the Appellants lack standing should

that basis for dismissal is discussed in this section.

for dismissal in

known

for twenty years in the Shoreline Plan

provided further analysis 0f the constitutional issue in

and Order Denying Motion

and

CCDC

dismissed

The lack 0f standing

is

The

be afﬁrmed

adequate reason

and could have been the end 0f the inquiry. But the ﬁnding of no

Violation 0f Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution should also be
the subsequent sections of this brief.

afﬁrmed and

is

discussed in

The Supreme Court of Idaho has addressed
validity of an urban renewal plan.

Thomson

v.

the speciﬁc issue 0f standing to challenge the

City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002).

In Thomson, plaintiff ﬁled a complaint seeking a declaratory

judgment invalidating a Lewiston

City Council ordinance approving an urban renewal plan. The complaint alleged that “Plaintiff is
a resident and taxpayer in the City of Lewiston,

Nez Perce County,

pursuant t0 the provisions of § 50-2027 Idaho Code.”

afﬁrmed the holding 0f the
Miles

standing analysis.

v.

district court that

Id. at

Thomson must

Idaho, and a person 0f interest

475.

The Idaho Supreme Court

establish standing under a traditional

Idaho Power Co.,116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989)

set forth the

three elements of standing:

“The doctrine of standing focuses 0n the party seeking relief and not on the
the party Wishes to have adjudicated.”
1.

issues

2.

“[T]0 satisfy the case or controversy requirement 0f standing, litigants generally

must allege 0r demonstrate an injury

and a substantial likelihood
judicial relief requested Will prevent 0r redress the claimed injury.”
3.

“[A] citizen and taxpayer

the injury

Thomson

at

is

may

one suffered alike by

in fact

that that

not challenge a governmental enactment Where
all citizens

477, quoting Boundary Backpackers

P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (quoting Miles, 116 Idaho

v.

at

and taxpayers of the jurisdiction.”

Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913
641, 778 P.2d at 763).

Idaho Code § 50-2027(2) provides, in pertinent part: “For a period of thirty (30) days after
the effective date of the ordinance 0r resolution, any person of interest shall have the right to

contest the legality 0f such ordinance, resolution or proceeding 0r any bonds

Which may be

authorized thereby.“ (emphasis added.) “[T]he legislature did not intend to broaden the traditional
standing requirements
in enacting Idaho

by using the term ‘person 0f interest’

Code

§

50-2027. Thomson

at

478.

as a person

“By using

Who

could bring an action”

the term ‘any person in interest’

we

rather than ‘any person,’

and incorporate

plaintiffs,

hold that the legislature intended to limit the number of possible

common law

standing principles.

Code

Therefore, Idaho

does not eliminate the need for a plaintiff to satisfy traditional standing requirements.

50-2027

§

.

.” Id. at

.

478.

As

in

Thomson, Appellants allege that they are residents and taxpayers in the City and

County, except for Appellant Mike Gleason being a resident of the City of Eagle, rather than the
City of Boise. (R., pp. 000015-000016.) Appellants lack standing because they do not “allege any
particularized injury, but rather only an injury that

of the jurisdiction.”
solely

by

Id. at

477. Idaho

Code

§

is

‘suffered alike

by

all citizens

and taxpayers

50-2027(2) does not confer standing on a plaintiff

Virtue of being a taxpayer.

Appellants responded to the Thomson traditional standing argument claiming that

Koch

v.

Canyon County, 145 Idaho

158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008) established that taxpayers of a jurisdiction

have standing to seek

on constitutional grounds. Appellants alleged a Violation of Article

relief

VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution,

No

Which provides,

in pertinent part,

county, city, board 0f education, 0r school

district,

or other subdivision of

the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any

purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for

it

for such

year, without the assent 0f tWO-thirds 0f the qualiﬁed electors.

The

plaintiffs in

Koch

v.

Canyon County, supra

are

Canyon County taxpayers who brought

over a lease entered into by Canyon County for a parcel 0f land upon which t0 build a
other facilities.

Constitution.

It

The

and dismissed the

was alleged
district court

case.

that the lease

agreement violated Article VIII,

found that the

plaintiffs lacked standing to

The appeal was dismissed because

the issue raised

§ 3

make

jail

suit

and

of the Idaho

that challenge

became moot, but

the

Idaho Supreme Court held that electors and taxpayers of Canyon County have standing to

4

challenge whether the lease agreement violated Article VIII, §

Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008). The reason that Koch
case

is

that Boise City did not incur

of Article VIII,

§ 3

any “indebtedness or

subsequent sections 0f this

one suffered by

t0

meet the

is

all

brief.

The

district court

was

Canyon County, 145

v.

not applicable t0 the instant

liability” to bring

of the Idaho Constitution. This was the ﬁnding of the

000056-000057, 000102-000103), and the basis of

is

Koch

3.

that

ﬁnding

correct in

its

it

Within the purview

district court (R., pp.

further discussed in the

is

ﬁnding

that the injury alleged

taxpayers 0f the jurisdiction. (R., p. 000054.) Therefore, Appellants needed

traditional standing requirements as enunciated in

Thomson, Which they

failed t0 d0.

BOISE CITY DID NOT CREATE A CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO THE CCDC

B.

VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 3 OF THE IDAHO
CONSTITUTION BY PROMULGATING THE SUBJECT ORDINANCES
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 8 50-2906.

IN

The

district court

was

arguments relate t0 the
indebtedness or
(R., pp.

liability,

correct in dismissing the case for lack of standing, but the following

district court’s

other basis for dismissal; Boise City did not incur

and therefore did not Violate Article VIII,

§ 3

of the Idaho Constitution.

000056-000057.)

The contention that Boise City created a continuing obligation t0
Article VIII, § 3 0f the Idaho Constitution

seems rooted

ﬁnancing (“TIF”). The subject 0f this lawsuit
the

Gateway

district is

Under the
set

Plan.

The

CCDC

formed the

is

the

CCDC in Violation of

in a misunderstanding

of tax increment

two urban renewal plans, the Shoreline Plan and

districts

formed the property tax value Within the
plans, property taxes are levied as usual,

where TIF funds Will be

district is assessed,

and

that portion

Which

allocated.

is

Once

the

the set base value.

0f the taxes attributable to the

base value goes to the various taxing authorities entitled thereto. These taxing entities include

Boise City, the

Ada County Highway

District,

Ada
5

County, School District No.

1,

Ada County

Emergency Medical, Mosquito Abatement District, and College of Western Idaho. Under an urban
renewal plan, the TIF

As

district receives tax

property values increase in the TIF

district,

revenues above those generated from the set base value.

district,

so do the excess tax revenues that go to the TIF

while the tax revenues t0 the other taxing entities remain constant. These excess revenues

are the increment in tax increment ﬁnancing.

Spencer

W. Holm, What’s

the Tiﬁ’about TIF?:

An

Incremental Approach t0 Improving the Perception, Awareness, and Eﬂectiveness 0f Urban

Renewal

in

Idaho, 50 Idaho L. Rev. 273, 281 (2014).

In the

Amended

Complaint, Appellants acknowledge that “[a]s required by Idaho Code

50-2908, the TIF revenues allocated t0 the
paid directly t0 the

CCDC pursuant to the

directly to the

TIF

Ordinances are calculated and

CCDC by the County Treasurer 0f Ada County, Idaho.” (R., p.

Boise City does not create a continuing obligation to the
district

§

CCDC,

000020, ﬂ 32.)

but rather, the TIF funds go

from the County Treasurer, and Boise City has simply foregone property

tax revenues exceeding those attributable t0 the set base value in the TIF district. Therefore, Boise

City has not created any continuing obligation t0 the

CCDC.

Article VIII, § 3 ofthe Idaho Constitution speaks 0f “any indebtedness or liability”, speciﬁc

terms that are not necessarily synonymous with an obligation. Boise City, in following the Local

Economic Development Act, Idaho Code

§

50-2901

et seq.

and passing the Shoreline and Gateway

ordinances, has not created any indebtedness 0r liability to Boise City.

C.

THE SHORELINE PLAN AND GATEWAY PLAN ORDINANCES,
BOISE CITY DID NOT INCUR A “LIABILITY” IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
VIII, 8 3 OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION.
IN PASSING

Appellants’ allegation that the Shoreline Plan and the

liability for

Boise City

is

Gateway Plan

create indebtedness 0r

not only unsupported by authority, the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly

The only part of tax increment ﬁnancing that creates indebtedness or liability

ruled to the contrary.

is

the issuance 0f TIF bonds, but these bonds are issued

TIF bonds are an indebtedness 0r

liability

0f the

by

CCDC,

the

(1 972)

and

later

reafﬁrmed

in

City. Therefore,

not Boise City, and the Idaho Supreme

Court has held accordingly. In Boise Redevelopment Agency

499 P.2d 575

CCDC, not Boise

v.

Yick

Kong Corp, 94 Idaho

876,

Urban Renewal Agency 0fthe City ofRexburg v. Hart,

148 Idaho 299, 222 P.3d 467 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court declared that urban renewal
agencies, as authorities independent 0f cities, are not subject t0 the constitutional limits

incurring debt Without voter approval found in Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution.

It is

on
the

CCDC that may issue TIF bonds.
In 1971, Boise

against the property 0f

Redevelopment Agency (“BRA”) brought a condemnation proceeding
Yick Kong Corporation,

property for urban renewal.

The

by

the

BRA

purchase of the

resulting appeal addressed the constitutionality 0f the Idaho

Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Idaho Code
condemnation, but Yick

after negotiations failed for the

§

50-2001

Kong appealed With one 0f its

et seq.

The

district court

granted the

claims being that the revenue bonds used

violated Article VIII, § 3 0f the Idaho Constitution,

Which prevents a municipality

from incurring debt without taxpayer approval. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the
court

0n

this issue,

Kong Corp, supra
The Court ruled

ﬁnding n0 such constitutional
at 880.

Violation. Boise

Yick Kong argued that the

differently,

ﬁnding

that, “[t]he

Redevelopment Agency

district

v.

Yick

BRA was the alter ego of the City of Boise.

degree of control exercised by the City of Boise

does not usurp the powers and duties 0f the plaintiff [BRA], and the close association between the

two

entities at

purposes.”

most shows two independent public

Id. at

882.

Of more

entities closely

cooperating for valid public

import to the instant case, “[h]erein plaintiff [BRA] has no ability

to actually

encumber any of the resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend beyond

ﬁmds and property

the Idaho

Urban Renewal Agency 0fthe City ofRexburg

On December 21,

v.

Supreme Court With

2009 decision

its

Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 222 P.3d 467 (2009).

2005, the City of Rexburg approved the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of

Rexburg’s (“the Agency”) plan t0 construct a public outdoor swimming

community events

facility,

a sporting and

building, and outdoor ﬁelds using revenue allocation ﬁnancing.

The Agency

On March

ﬁled for judicial conﬁrmation of the validity 0f the bonds to be issued under the plan.
28, 2008, Hart ﬁled a

Response

petition be denied, asserting as

Idaho Code

§

own

holdings.” Id. at 883.

The Yick Kong holding was reafﬁrmed by
in

its

50-2901

t0 Petition for Judicial

Conﬁrmation asking

that the

Agency’s

one of his objections, that the Local Economic Development Act,

et seq. violates Article VIII, § 3

of the Idaho Constitution, Which prohibits

a city from incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a speciﬁc year

without the assent 0f qualiﬁed electors. The

district court rej ected Hart’s

and nine urban renewal agencies ﬁled a brief as amici curiae

in support

arguments, he appealed,

0f the Agency. The Idaho

Supreme Court afﬁrmed the district court and rej ected Hart’s argument that “[A]gencies
‘alter

egos’ of their cities

violates Article VIII, §§ 3

— and

are merely

thus urban renewal agencies’ use 0f revenue allocation ﬁnancing

and 4 0f the Idaho Constitution.”

Id. at

301. Hart

made

the

same

“alter

ego” argument that the Idaho Supreme Court rej ected in Boise RedevelopmentAgency v. Yick Kong

Corp, which decision was reafﬁrmed.

The Agencies’

Id. at

302.

brief demonstrates that cities across the State have

ﬁnanced over 60

proj ects through revenue allocation ﬁnancing in the 27 years since we decided Yick
Kong. This Widespread reliance on our holding that urban renewal agencies are not
“alter egos” of cities is well-justiﬁed, given that the decision was unanimous. 94
Idaho at 885, 499 P.2d at 584. If we were to accept Hart’s argument that urban
renewal agencies are merely alter egos of their respective municipalities, we would

8

unanimous, long-standing precedent and thwart the reasonable
expectations of numerous bondholders.
We are unable to conclude that our
decision in Yick Kong is “manifestly wrong.” Accordingly, “’the rule 0f stare
overrule

decisis dictates that

we

follow

it.

.”’
.

.

Greenough

v.

Farm Bureau Mut.

Ins.

C0. 0f

142 Idaho 589, 592, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2006) (quoting Houghland
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)).

Idaho,

303.

Id. at

Boise City acted in accordance with the authority given

by

it

the Idaho State Legislature

through the Local Economic Development Act (Idaho Code § 50-2901 et seq). Idaho

Rule

is

a Dillon’s

Speciﬁcally, Dillon’s Rule provides:

state.

It is

a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation

possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and n0 others: First, those

granted in express words; second, those necessarily 0r fairly implied

in,

0r incident

powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation--not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair,
to, the

reasonable doubt concerning the existence 0f power
against the corporation, and the

transcendent importance, and

power

lie

at

is

denied.

.

.

is
.

resolved by the courts

These principles are 0f

the foundation of the law 0f municipal

corporations.

John

Commentaries 0n the

F. Dillon,

Law ofMunicipal

Dillon’s Rule has been adopted

corporation law.

by

the Idaho

Supreme Court

Water
C0.

v.

it.”

& Light

in regard to municipal

“Idaho has long recognized the proposition that a municipal corporation, as a

creature 0f the state, possesses and exercises only those

granted t0

Corporations, § 55, at 101-02 (1872).

Caesar
C0.

v.

v.

State, 101

Cizfy

powers

either expressly or impliedly

Idaho 158, 160, 610 P.2d 517, 519 (1980) (citing Sandpoint

ofSandpoint, 31 Idaho 498, 503, 173 P. 972, 973 (1918); Boise Dev.

Boise City, 30 Idaho 675, 688, 167 P. 1032, 1034-35 (1917)). Indeed, “under Dillon’s Rule,

a municipal corporation

may

constitution 0r the legislature

exercise only those powers granted to

and the

legislature has absolute

it

by

either the state

power to change, modify or destroy

those powers at

its

discretion.”

(citing State

Id.

v.

Steunenberg, 5 Idaho

45

1, 4,

P. 462,

463

(1896)).

The Local Economic Development Act (“the Act”), Idaho Code
grants municipalities the ability and authority to

§

50-2901

et seq. expressly

ﬁnance the economic growth and development of

urban renewal areas. The Act expressly deﬁnes the powers granted t0 the municipality and
forth

its

role in revenue allocation

ﬁnancing as part of an urban renewal plan. Idaho Code

2904 speciﬁcally authorizes Idaho

cities to

sets

§ 50-

enact ordinances that adopt urban renewal plans

containing revenue allocation ﬁnancing provisions, in pertinent part, as follows:

An

authorized municipality

is

hereby authorized and empowered t0 adopt,

at

any

time, a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision, as described in this chapter, as part

0f an urban renewal plan 0r competitively disadvantaged border community area
ordinance.

Idaho Code § 50-2904.
Idaho Code § 50-2910 states that the bonds issued under the Local Economic Development

Act are not the general obligation of the agency or municipality,
Except

t0 the extent

as follows:

0f moneys deposited in a special fund 0r funds under

this act

payment 0f the principal of and interest on bonds or other
agency shall not be liable 0n any such bonds 0r other obligations.
The bonds issued and other obligations incurred by any agency under this chapter
shall not constitute a general obligation 0r debt 0f any municipality, the state or any
0f its political subdivisions. In n0 event shall such bonds 0r other obligations give
rise to general obligation or liability 0f the agency, the municipality, the state, 0r
any 0f its political subdivisions, 0r give rise t0 a charge against their general credit
0r taxing powers, 0r be payable out 0f any funds or properties other than the special
fund or funds of the agency pledged therefor; and such bonds and other obligations
shall so state 0n their face. Such bonds and other obligations shall not constitute an
indebtedness or the pledging 0f faith and credit Within the meaning 0f any
and pledged

t0 the

obligations, the

constitutional 0r statutory debt limitation 0r restriction.

Idaho Code § 50-2910.

10

Boise City has complied with the Local Economic Development Act, Idaho Code

2901

et seq. in

§ 50-

passing the Shoreline and Gateway ordinances. If Appellants are challenging the

constitutionality 0f the Local

Economic Development Act With Which Boise City complied,

Appellants have the burden 0f overcoming the presumption that the legislation

Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 754, 9 P.3d 1217, 1220

(2000).

It is

McLean

v.

756, 760 (2006) (quoting Olsen

v.

statute constitutional.”

is

to

v.

its

constitutional powers,

and any

be resolved in favor of that which will render the

Maverik Country
J.A.

valid. State

“generally presumed that legislative

acts are constitutional, that the state legislature has acted Within

doubt concerning interpretation of a statute

is

Stores, Ina, 142 Idaho 810, 814, 135 P.3d

Freeman Ca, 117 Idaho 706, 709, 491 P.2d 1285, 1288

(1990)).

Appellants’ contention that the subject ordinances create

liability”, is

some

of “promissory

sort

completely lacking 0f any factual or legal authority. (Appellants’ Br.,

put, the Shoreline

and Gateway ordinances do not create any indebtedness or

Simply

p. 19.)

liability in

Boise

City.

D.

BOISE CITY

IS

ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL PURSUANT
12-117 AND/OR S 12-121.

TO IDAHO CODE S

This appeal was brought in disregard t0 established Idaho case law.

Thomson

City 0f

v.

Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002) holds that under Idaho Code, Appellants lack
standing t0 challenge the urban renewal

districts.

The Idaho Supreme Court established

that the

City does not create an indebtedness 0r liability in creating an urban renewal district and therefore

does not Violate Article VIII, § 3 0f the Idaho Constitution. Boise Redevelopment Agency

Kong Corp, 94

v.

Yick

Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 (1972), Urban Renewal Agency 0f City ofRexburg

Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 303, 222 P.3d 467, 471 (2009).

11

Boise City

is

entitled t0

v.

an award of

reasonable attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in an appeal brought without a reasonable basis
in fact 0r

law pursuant

to Idaho

award of reasonable attorney’s

Code

§ 12-1 17.

In the alternative, Boise City

fees pursuant to Idaho

Code

§

is

entitled t0

an

12-121 as this appeal was brought

or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Respondent respectfully requests

afﬁrm

the

judgment 0f the

dismissing Plaintiffs’

district court

that this

Court

below, granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and

Amended Complaint

with prejudice. The Respondent also seeks an award

of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

DATED this

14th

day of August 2020.

OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY

Scott B. Muir,

Deputy Cay Attorney

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Ihereby

certify that I

have on

this

14th

day of August 2020, electronically ﬁled the

foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the iCourt system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing
to the following persons:

John L. Runft

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
at Law
W. Main St.,

Attorneys

1020

Suite

400

Boise, Idaho 83702

JRunft@runftsteele.com

szfm

Scott B.

Muir

Deputy City Attorney
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